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To Kill a Cuckoo Bird: Louisiana’s Dual Paternity
Problem
INTRODUCTION
In addition to being the favorite bird of European clockmakers,1 the
cuckoo is also what is known as a “brood parasite.”2 Cuckoos, rather than
building their own nests, seize control of the nests of other birds.3 The
cuckoo finds another bird’s nest and then, while the other bird is away,
lays its eggs in the nest.4 If the other bird fails to notice the deception, the
cuckoo’s egg will hatch and the cuckoo hatchling will take over the nest,
hoisting the victim bird’s eggs on its back and dropping them out of the
nest to their destruction.5 The unknowing victim bird will continue to care
for the cuckoo hatchling as though it were its own, nourishing the offspring
of the cuckoo who has harmed it so greatly.6 Even if the victim bird
discovers the deception, it is often compelled to continue to support and
nourish the young cuckoo under threat of attack by the parent cuckoo who
perches nearby.7
Much like the cuckoo’s victim, men in Louisiana are also deceived
into raising and supporting the biological children of other men and, even
if they discover the deception, are often compelled by the force of law to
continue to do so. In Louisiana, if a man is married to a woman who has
an affair with another man resulting in the birth of a child, the husband,
who is not the biological father of the child, will be presumed to be the
legal father of the child.8 If the husband does not take legal action to
disavow his paternity within one year of the child’s birth, even if he has
no reason yet to question his paternity, he will be considered the child’s

Copyright 2017, by HENRY S. RAUSCHENBERGER.
1. For a history of the cuckoo clock see Jimmy Stamp, The Past, Present
and Future of the Cuckoo Clock, SMITHSONIAN (May 17, 2013), http://www.smith
sonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-past-present-and-future-of-the-cuckoo-clock-65
073025/?no-ist [https://perma.cc/AL2F-4GNF].
2. Karl Schulze-Hagen, Bard G. Stokke & Tim R. Birkhead, Reproductive
Biology of the European Cuckoo Cuculus Canorus: Early Insights, Persistent
Errors and the Acquisition of Knowledge, J. ORNITHOLOGY, Jan. 2009, at 1, 1–2.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Rachael Winfree, Cuckoos, Cowbirds and the Persistence of Brood
Parasitism, 14 TREE 338, 338 (1999).
7. Id. at 340.
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 (2017).
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legal father and will be responsible for the child’s financial support.9 Even
if the biological father of the child is identified and made legally
responsible for the child, the legal father will remain legally responsible
as well because, unique amongst the states, Louisiana allows for a child to
have two legally recognized fathers through the doctrine of “dual
paternity.”10 Both the legal father and the biological father will be equally
recognized as the child’s father and dually responsible for the child’s
financial support.11
Dual paternity has been the subject of fierce debate in Louisiana12 and
across the United States,13 particularly when, as in the majority of
instances in Louisiana, it is forced upon the legal father due to the marital
presumption of paternity.14 The primary argument against the doctrine is
that it creates a “trifecta of insult and injury”15 to the wife’s husband, who
must now “suffer the betrayal by his wife, the shock of learning that his
child is not biologically his, and now, the indignity of being forced to
financially support a child born of his wife’s adultery.”16 In addition to this
inherent unfairness, the courts of Louisiana have been inconsistent in
dealing with the doctrine, particularly when it comes to the manner in
which they have allocated child support obligations between dual fathers.17
9. Id. art. 189 (2015).
10. Sandi Varnado, Who’s Your Daddy?: A Legitimate Question Given
Louisiana’s Lack of Legislation Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 66
LA. L. REV. 609, 628 (2006).
11. Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money: Reflections on the
Financial Implications of Multiple Parentage, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 217,
228 (2010).
12. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Who’s Your Momma, Who Are Your Daddies?
Louisiana’s New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 307, 321 (2007) [hereinafter
Who’s Your Momma?].
13. See Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s Company? How American Law Can
Recognize a Third Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS
WOMEN L.J. 171 (2008) (advocating the adoption of dual paternity and maternity
schemes nationwide).
14. See, e.g., Jacinta M. Testa, Finishing Off Forced Fatherhood: Does It
Really Matter If Blood or DNA Evidence Can Rebut the Presumption of
Paternity?, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2004); Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two
Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 810
(2006).
15. Rachel L. Kovach, Sorry Daddy—Your Time Is Up: Rebutting the
Presumption of Paternity in Louisiana, 56 LOY. L. REV. 651, 653 (2010).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Williams, 605 So. 2d 7 (La. Ct. App.
1992); Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Munson v. Washington, 747 So. 2d 1245 (La.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court has clearly established the principle that a
biological father owes a duty of support to his biological child, even if
another man is the legal father of that child due to the presumption of
paternity.18 The Court has, however, specifically declined to answer the
question of whether the presumed legal father of the child also shares in
this obligation of support,19 leading to wildly varying decisions by lower
courts.20
Recently, in Department of Children and Family Services ex rel. A.L.
v. Lowrie, the Louisiana Supreme Court answered a portion of the question
regarding the allocation of the support obligation between legal and
biological fathers in dual paternity situations.21 In Lowrie, the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmatively held that a legal father is entitled to have the
court consider the income of a child’s biological father when calculating
the legal father’s child support obligation in dual paternity situations.22
Although this decision injects a small measure of fairness into the doctrine
of dual paternity by requiring the consideration of a biological father’s
income in the legal father’s child support determination, it does not go far
enough.
Lowrie leaves the doctrine of dual paternity intact, meaning former
husbands are still financially responsible for, and legally bound to,
children who are products of their wives’ adultery, against their will.
Furthermore, although the decision requires consideration of the
biological father’s income, it provides no framework or methodology for
lower courts to utilize in doing so, creating fertile ground for continued
judicial confusion. The only way to solve the problem and the unfairness
and confusion that result from it is legislative action aimed at eliminating
the occurrence of forced dual paternity altogether.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of Louisiana’s law of
filiation and how it has given rise to the doctrinal problem of dual
paternity. Part II describes the Louisiana Supreme Court’s attempt to
Ct. App. 1999); Louisiana ex rel. Wilson v. Wilson, 855 So. 2d 913 (La. Ct. App.
1992); Fontenot v. Thierry, 422 So. 2d 586 (La. Ct. App. 1982); J.M.Y. v. R.R.,
1 So. 3d 725 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Starks v. Powell, 552 So. 2d 609 (La. Ct. App.
1989); Jones v. Rodrigue, 771 So. 2d 275 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
18. Gallo v. Gallo, 861 So. 2d 168, 180 (La. 2003).
19. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854–55 (La. 1989). See infra Part I.B.
20. See, e.g., Williams, 605 So. 2d 7; Washington, 747 So. 2d 1245; Wilson,
855 So. 2d 913; Fontenot, 422 So. 2d 586; J.M.Y., 1 So. 3d 725; Starks, 552 So.
2d 609; Jones, 771 So. 2d 275.
21. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. ex rel. A.L. v. Lowrie, 167 So. 3d 573,
585 (La. 2015).
22. Id.
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mitigate the harm caused by the doctrine with its decision in Lowrie, by
explaining the decision in full and discussing its effect. Part III details the
problems that still remain with the doctrine of dual paternity post-Lowrie.
Part IV suggests a solution for the problem of forced dual paternity
through modification the legal provisions which give rise to it. Finally, the
Addendum addresses changes made by the legislature to Louisiana’s law
of filiation after this Comment was accepted for publication.
I. DUAL PATERNITY HATCHES IN LOUISIANA
In Louisiana, the law of filiation is the foundation of the doctrine of
dual paternity. Filiation refers to the legal relationship between parent and
child, and the “law of filiation” is the method by which these legal
relations are determined and established.23 Dual paternity was created by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in an attempt to align Louisiana’s law of
paternal filiation with changing legal and social reality.24 The Court found
it necessary to create the doctrine of dual paternity due to a conflict
between the traditional manner in which the law of Louisiana determines
paternity and modern science which can determine biological paternity
with near certainty.25 Later, the legislature chose to codify the doctrine.26
Ultimately, the narrative of dual paternity begins with the legal creation of
one father and ends with the judicial formation of a second.
A. Fatherhood in Louisiana
The Louisiana Civil Code defines filiation as “the legal relationship
between a child and his parent.”27 Filiation is established in three ways: by
proof of maternity; by proof of paternity; or by adoption.28 Proof of
maternity is conceptually straightforward29 and is “established by a
23. John R. Trahan, Glossae on the New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV.
387, 388 n.1 (2007) (“Filiation is defined as ‘the [juridical] line that unites a child
to his father or to his mother: to his father, paternal filiation or paternity; to his
mother, maternal filiation or maternity.’” (quoting GÉRARD CORNU, DROIT CIVIL:
LA FAMILLE 313 (7th ed. 2001))).
24. See infra Part I.B.1.
25. See infra Part I.B.3.
26. See id.
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 178 (2017).
28. Id. art. 179.
29. Modern technology has made this legal determination of maternity no
longer such a conceptually straightforward matter, allowing for women to give
birth to children with whom they share no biological relation. For a comparison
of different legal approaches to establishing maternal filiation in light of new
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preponderance of the evidence that the child was born of a particular
woman, except as otherwise provided by law.”30 This principle mater
semper certa est, or “the mother is always certain,” is supported by the
presumption mater is est quem gestation demonstrant, or “the mother is
the woman whom the pregnancy points to.”31 This presumption has existed
since Roman times and reflects the former biological certainty that a child
born of a mother is her child.32
In contrast, establishing the paternity of a child has historically been a
more complex endeavor because of natural uncertainties that existed
before the advent of paternity testing. Specifically, there is no physical
event, such as the mother’s giving birth, with which to definitively
establish the paternity of a particular man.33 Given this uncertainty, the law
in Louisiana and elsewhere created legal methods for establishing proof of
paternity. Louisiana has two primary methods for establishing proof of
paternity and thereby filiating child to father: presumptions of paternity34
and judicial action.35

advancements in reproductive technology see Marsha Garrison, Law Making for
Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to Determination of Legal Parentage,
113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000).
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 184.
31. Magdalena Duggan, Mater Semper Certa Est, Sed Pater Incertus?
Determining Filiation of Children Conceived via Assisted Reproductive
Techniques: Comparative Characteristics and Visions for the Future, 4 IRISH J.
L. STUDIES 1, 4 (2014). This “biological certainty” that a woman is the mother of
a child to whom she gives birth is not such a certainty given modern reproductive
technology, but this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. See id.
32. Id.
33. See Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the
Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547 (2000).
34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
35. See infra Part I.A.2. In Louisiana, the methods of establishing paternity
are: (1) the martial presumption, id. art. 185; (2) the contestation action, id. art.
191; (3) acknowledgement, id. art. 192; (4) the Father’s Action to Establish
Paternity, id. art. 198; (5) the Child’s Action to Establish Paternity, id. art. 197;
adult adoption, id. art. 199; and child adoption, governed by the provisions of the
Children’s Code. Only the marital presumption, id. art. 185; the Father’s Action
to Establish Paternity, id. art. 198; and the Child’s Action to Establish Paternity,
id. art. 197, will be discussed fully in this a Comment as they are the most
pertinent to the issue of dual paternity. For a complete discussion of all of the
methods of establishing paternity, and other matters related to filiation see Trahan,
supra note 23.
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1. Establishing Legal Fatherhood Through the Presumption of
Paternity
The marital presumption of paternity is a passive method of filiating a
child to a father, as it requires no filing or affirmative act by any party. In
Louisiana, the husband of the mother of a child is presumed to be the father
of that child if that child is born during the marriage or within 300 days
from the date of the termination of the marriage.36 This method of
establishing paternity can be traced to the Romans, who established the
presumption pater is est quem nuptiae demonstrant, or “the father is the
man whom the marriage points out,”37 to address the uncertainty as to a
child’s paternity that existed in an age before genetic testing.38 In
Louisiana, this marital presumption of paternity is considered the
“strongest presumption in the law.”39 However, Louisiana law does
provide an opportunity for husbands to rebut this presumption by way of
the disavowal action.40
The disavowal action is a legal action by which a man, legally
recognized as the father of a child, attempts to disestablish his legal
fatherhood by disproving his paternity of the child.41 The action for
disavowal of paternity is subject to a brief liberative prescription42 of one
year, which runs from the day the husband learns or should have learned
of the birth of the child.43 Although former Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 9:305 provided for a suspension of prescription in cases in which
the father erroneously believed that he was the father of the child due to
fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit on the part of the mother, this statute
was repealed in 2006.44 Currently, the only exception to this short
prescriptive period occurs if the husband and mother have been living
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185.
37. See Duggan, supra note 31.
38. Id.
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 cmt. b (first citing Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 So.
2d 619 (La. 1972); and then citing Williams v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 707 (La.
1956)) (“[I]t has been said in the jurisprudence of this court that [the presumption
that the husband of the mother is the father of the child] is the strongest
presumption known in the law.”).
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 187.
41. See generally Trahan, supra note 23; 14 C.J.S. Children Out-of-Wedlock §
30 (2015). To disavow is “[t]o disown; to disclaim knowledge of or responsibility
for; to repudiate.” Disavow, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 561 (10th ed. 2009).
42. For a general discussion of liberative prescription see Bailey v. Khoury,
891 So. 2d 1268 (La. 2005).
43. LA. CIV. CODE art. 189 (2015).
44. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:305 (1997), repealed by 2006 La. Acts. No. 344.
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“separate and apart . . . continuously” for the 300 days immediately
preceding the child’s birth.45 In such cases, prescription for the disavowal
action does not commence to run until the husband is notified in writing
“that a party in interest has asserted that the husband is the father of the
child.”46
Both the legislature and the judiciary have justified the one-year
prescriptive limit for disavowal actions as serving the state’s public
policies of “(1) preserving the family unit, (2) protecting the individual
child from emotional harm and the stigma of illegitimacy, and (3) the need
to recognize biological fact.”47 It is this prescriptive period that, in most
instances, gives rise to dual paternity situations. This situation occurs
when a husband becomes aware of his wife having given birth to a child
but remains unaware of the possibility that his wife’s child may not be his
until after this short prescriptive period of a year’s time has run. After this
prescriptive window has “closed,” the husband will forever be prevented
from disavowing his paternity of the child even if the child’s true
biological father is identified and his biological paternity proven.48
2. Establishing Legal Fatherhood Through Judicial Action
Proof of paternity may also be established through judicial action.49 A
man may institute an action to establish his paternity of a child.50 If the
child is presumed to be the child of another man, the action is subject to a
peremptive period51 of one year from the day of the birth of the child.52 If
the mother in bad faith deceives the father regarding his paternity, the
peremptive period changes to one year from the day the father “knew or
should have known of his paternity, or within ten years from the day of the
birth of the child, whichever first occurs.”53 If the child is not presumed to
be the child of another man, the man seeking to establish his paternity may

45. LA. CIV. CODE art. 189.
46. Id. (this situation most often arises in the context of child support or
succession).
47. Kovach, supra note 15, at 679.
48. See Who’s Your Momma?, supra note 12.
49. LA. CIV. CODE art. 198 (2017). Louisiana law allows for paternity to be
determined through the use of blood and tissue tests. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:396,
3398.2 (2017).
50. LA. CIV. CODE art. 198.
51. For a general discussion of peremption see Ebinger v. Venus Const.
Corp., 65 So. 3d 1279 (La. 2011).
52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 198.
53. Id.
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institute the action at any time.54 However, in all cases, the action is subject
to a one-year peremptive period55 from the day of the death of the child.56
A child may also institute actions to prove paternity, even if presumed
under the law to be the child of another man.57 If the action is commenced
against a living father, the fact of paternity must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence.58 If the action is commenced after the
death of the alleged father, clear and convincing evidence must be shown
to prove paternity.59 The law imposes a stricter burden of proof to establish
filiation after the death of the alleged father to protect against fraudulent
claims against the alleged father’s succession.60 For purposes of
succession only, the action is subject to a peremptive period of one year,
commencing to run from the day of the death of the alleged father.61 Thus,
children are able to establish their filiative connection to a biological
parent at any time, provided that the father has not been deceased for over
one year.
Through these two actions a biological father may become filiated to
a child, even though another man is presumed to be that child’s father.62
When these two methods of establishing paternity—marital presumption
of paternity and judicial action—operate in tandem, dual paternity occurs,
and problems begin. Although the Civil Code now clearly provides for

54. Id.
55. Peremption is a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a right.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3458; see also WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, TORT LAW § 10:11, in
12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 2015). This time period can be
contrasted from liberative prescription, which is a bar to the bringing of a cause
of action because of its untimely filing. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3447; Liberative
Prescription, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014).
56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 198. The one-year prescriptive period from the death
of the child was enacted by the legislature under the theory that a father who has
failed during the child’s life to assume parental responsibilities should not be
permitted unlimited time in which to institute an action to benefit from that child’s
death. Id. art. 198 cmt. d.
57. Id. art. 197.
58. State v. Shaddinger, 702 So. 2d 965, 970 (La. Ct. App. 1997), writ denied,
709 So. 2d 743 (La. 1998); Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Thomas, 660 So. 2d 163, 165
(La. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Litton v. Litton, 624 So. 2d 472 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
(“Simply stated, it must be shown that paternity . . . is more probable than not.”).
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 197.
60. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Persons, 43 LA. L. REV. 535, 537 (1982)
[hereinafter Persons].
61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 197.
62. See id. art. 185.
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dual paternity, this was not always the case.63 These articles codify a
judicial doctrine whose creation was one of necessity, whose extension
was born of confusion, and whose codification was the product of heated
disagreement.
B. The Doctrine of Dual Paternity Arises
The path to Louisiana’s current doctrine of dual paternity begins with
the judiciary and ends in the legislature. The doctrine of dual paternity in
Louisiana arose from the 1974 Louisiana Supreme Court case of Warren
v. Richard in an attempt to reconcile Louisiana family law with then-recent
United States Supreme Court precedent.64 The Louisiana Supreme Court
later extended its judicial creation to the realm of child support in Smith v.
Cole, holding that a biological father owed support to his children even if
those children were legally presumed to be the children of another man.65
Finally, after heated debate, the doctrine was codified by the legislature,
becoming fully entrenched in the law of Louisiana.66
1. The Birth of the Doctrine
The Louisiana Supreme Court case of Warren v. Richard involved an
attempt by an illegitimate child to recover for the wrongful death of her
biological father when, at the same time, she was recognized under the law
as the legitimate child of another man.67 Citing then-recent United States
Supreme Court decisions holding legal burdens placed on illegitimate
children unconstitutional, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that it
could not hold that the biological child of the deceased man could not
recover for his wrongful death merely because she was presumed to be the
child of another man.68 Such a holding, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reasoned, “would run counter to the principles established in the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court . . . and would ignore the existence of
the child’s biological father.”69 Attempting to reconcile Louisiana’s law of

63. See Who’s Your Momma?, supra note 12.
64. Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
65. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 848 (La. 1989), superseded by statute on
other grounds, 2004 La. Acts No. 530 (amending Civil Code article 191).
66. See infra Part I.B.3.
67. Warren, 296 So. 2d at 815.
68. Id. at 817.
69. Id.
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paternal filiation with the United States Supreme Court’s recent rulings,70
the Louisiana Supreme Court made Louisiana the first and only state in
which a child could simultaneously have two legally recognized fathers.71
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted in its opinion that the result in
Warren would allow the child to recover for the death of both her
biological and legal fathers, but further noted that this concept was not
unique in Louisiana law, as a similar result was specifically provided for
in the case of adopted children.72 The Court specifically noted its
“mindfulness” of the problems that a logical extension of its holding could
create in regard to support and maintenance obligations, but believed that
they were required to adhere to the constitutional principles announced by
the United States Supreme Court.73 The Louisiana Supreme Court’s
prediction of issues arising in support situations was in fact quite
prophetic, as it was not long after the decision in Warren v. Richard that
these issues began to arise.74
2. Extension of the Doctrine
It took only a little over a decade for the doctrine of dual paternity to
arise in the context of support. In Smith v. Cole, the Louisiana Supreme
Court considered whether a mother could assert a paternity and support
action against an alleged biological father, notwithstanding the fact that
the child was conceived or born during the mother’s marriage to another
man and was thus presumed to be her husband’s legitimate child.75
Applying the concept of dual paternity arising from Warren v. Richard,
the Court held that a biological father had an obligation to support his child
regardless of whether that child was considered the legal child of another
man.76 The Court reasoned that “[s]ince [the legal father’s] failure to

70. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
71. See Griffin v. Succession of Branch, 479 So. 2d 324 (La. 1985); Malek v.
Yekani-Fard, 422 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1982); Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 451
(La. 1975).
72. Warren, 296 So. 2d at 817 (citing former article 214 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, which held that adoption did not divest a child of his or her right to
inherit from his or her biological parents).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., State ex rel. Poche v. Poche, 368 So. 2d 175 (La. Ct. App. 1979),
writ denied, 370 So. 2d 577 (La. 1979).
75. 553 So. 2d 847, 848 (La. 1989), superseded by statute on other grounds,
2004 La. Acts No. 530 (amending Civil Code article 191).
76. Id. at 854.
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disavow paternity would not preclude [the biological father] from bringing
an avowal action, it would be unjust to construe the presumption as to
provide [the biological father] with a safe harbor from child support
obligations.”77 Because the legal father was not a named party, the
Louisiana Supreme Court did not decide whether a legal father would
share in a support obligation with a biological father in dual paternity
situations.78
The lower courts of Louisiana followed the decision in Smith v. Cole
extensively,79 which established as jurisprudence constante80 both the
doctrine of dual paternity and the companion principle that a biological
father owes support obligations to his child even when the child has a
different legally presumed father.81 The lower courts, having no clear
guidance from the Louisiana Supreme Court, proceeded to allocate
support obligations to both the legal and biological fathers of children in
dual paternity situations, but the Court did so in a confused and haphazard
manner, without using a clear formula.82 This lack of uniformity in child
support was and remains a serious concern as it breeds inequity and runs
contrary to federal mandates regarding child support.83
3. Legislative Codification of the Doctrine
The doctrine of dual paternity moved from jurisprudence constante to
statutory in 1991. In 1991, the Marriage–Persons Committee of the
Louisiana Law Institute began a project that ultimately resulted in the
complete overhaul of the Louisiana Civil Code articles on filiation in

77. Id.
78. Id. at 858.
79. See Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. P.B. v. Reed, 52 So. 3d 145 (La. Ct. App.
2010); J.M.Y. v. R.R., 1 So. 3d 725 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Jones v. Rodrigue, 771
So. 2d 275 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Smith v. Dison, 662 So. 2d 90 (La. Ct. App.
1995).
80. Jurisprudence constante, or the tendency of courts to decide particular
cases in particular ways, is similar to the common-law concept of precedent
though it is of persuasive authority rather than binding. GÉRARD CORNU,
DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE 331 (Alain Levasseur & Marie-Eugénie LaporteLegeais trans. 2014); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (10th ed. 2009).
For a detailed discussion of the civilian doctrine of jurisprudence constante as it
pertains to Louisiana law see CRAWFORD, supra note 55, § 1:15.
81. See Reed, 52 So. 3d 145; J.M.Y., 1 So. 3d 725; Jones, 771 So. 2d 275;
Dison, 662 So. 2d 90.
82. Jacobs, supra note 11, at 288.
83. Louis I. Parley, Deviation or Modification, 16 FAM. ADVOC. 48, 48 (1993).
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2005.84 The most contentious issue faced by the Louisiana Law Institute
during its 14-year process of revision was dual paternity.85 The Council of
the Law Institute debated six times whether the law should allow for the
existence of dual paternity, and the debates often reached conflicting
results.86 Ultimately, the Law Institute opted for codification of the
doctrine of dual paternity.87 When the legislature adopted the
recommended changes, the doctrine of dual paternity, as born in the
Warren case and extended in Smith, became legislatively enshrined in
Louisiana’s law of filiation.88
II. TWO BIRDS, ONE EGG: LOWRIE
After the legislature codified the doctrine of dual paternity, lower
courts in Louisiana continued to struggle with the issue of child support
allocations in dual paternity situations.89 This unresolved issue has created
confusion for parents, family law practitioners, and the judiciary.90 The
Louisiana Supreme Court attempted to resolve some of this confusion with
its decision in Department of Children and Family Services ex rel. A.L. v.
Lowrie.91
A. Illicit Liaisons: The Background of Lowrie
The latest change to the doctrine of dual paternity arose from a set of
facts that are fairly common to most dual paternity situations. Thomas
Robert Lowrie and Melissa Percy Lowrie were married in December of
2002.92 During the marriage, Mrs. Lowrie gave birth to two children, A.L.
84. Who’s Your Momma?, supra note 12, at 307.
85. Id. at 321.
86. Id. at 307.
87. Kovach, supra note 15, at 659.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Dep’t of Social Services v. Williams, 605 So. 2d 7 (La. Ct. App.
1992); Dep’t of Social Services ex rel. Munson v. Washington, 747 So. 2d 1245
(La. Ct. App. 1999); State ex rel. Wilson v. Wilson, 855 So. 2d 913 (La. Ct. App.
1992); Fontenot v. Thierry, 422 So. 2d 586 (La. Ct. App. 1982); J.M.Y. v. R.R.,
1 So. 3d 725 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Starks v. Powell, 552 So. 2d 609 (La. Ct. App.
1989); Jones v. Rodrigue, 771 So. 2d 275 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
90. See, e.g., Williams, 605 So. 2d 7; Washington, 747 So. 2d 1245; Wilson,
855 So. 2d 913; Fontenot, 422 So. 2d 586; J.M.Y., 1 So. 3d 725; Starks, 552 So.
2d 609; Jones, 771 So. 2d 275.
91. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. ex rel. A.L. v. Lowrie, 167 So. 3d 573
(La. 2015).
92. Id. at 576.
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on February 4, 2003 and B.W. on May 4, 2009.93 The Lowries divorced in
October of 2010.94 Mr. Lowrie, believing Stephen A. Wetzel to be the true
biological father of the children, sought to disavow his paternity of both
A.L. and B.W.95 Mr. Lowrie successfully disavowed paternity of B.W. in
January of 2011.96 However, Mr. Lowrie’s action to disavow A.L. was
found to be untimely, and he therefore remained the legal father of A.L.97
In September 2012, the State of Louisiana, Department of Children
and Family Services (“DCFS”) filed an action against Mr. Lowrie in the
Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court seeking medical and child support for
A.L.98 DCFS filed the action under Louisiana’s child support enforcement
law,99 which creates a cause of action in its favor, as DCFS was allegedly
providing services for A.L.100 On January 22, 2013, both Mrs. and Mr.
Lowrie appeared before the juvenile court hearing officer on a rule for
child support.101 The hearing officer, taking only Mr. Lowrie’s income into
account, granted a temporary order of support against Mr. Lowrie for
$500.00 per month.102 Mr. Lowrie filed a “Petition for Third Party Claim,”
alleging that Mr. Wetzel was a necessary and indispensable party to the
support proceedings.103 This third-party claim was dismissed by the
juvenile court hearing officer.104 At a subsequent hearing before the
juvenile court judge, Mr. Lowrie presented a positive paternity test
showing that Mr. Wetzel was A.L.’s biological father.105 Mr. Lowrie also
presented evidence showing that A.L. and Mrs. Lowrie were currently
living with Mr. Wetzel.106 Even after Mr. Lowrie’s proffering of evidence,
the juvenile court judge upheld the hearing officer’s recommendation to
dismiss Mr. Lowrie’s third-party demand.107

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 46:236.1.1–46:238 (2012).
100. Lowrie, 167 So. 3d at 576 (what services were being provided is not
specified in the opinion).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 576–77.
103. Id. at 577.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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B. Untangling the Web: The Holding and Reasoning
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted Mr. Lowrie’s application for
writs in October of 2014, setting the stage for a potential paradigm shift in
Louisiana law concerning dual paternity.108 The Court had before it the
opportunity to bring clarity, reason, and equity to the doctrine of dual
paternity.109 However, the Court’s decision ultimately brought only a
small measure of clarity and reason, while leaving the fundamental
inequity of forced dual paternity intact.110
1. Holding
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a six-to-one decision,111 reversed the
Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court’s February 24, 2014 judgment of dismissal
and remanded to the juvenile court.112 In an opinion authored by Justice
Hughes, the Court held first that Mr. Lowrie was entitled to raise the
defense that he should be accorded a deviation from the child support
guidelines to take into account Mr. Wetzel’s income, if Mr. Wetzel’s
paternity of A.L. was proven;113 and second that Mr. Wetzel was a person
who should be joined as a party in the action as complete relief could not
be accorded in his absence.114
The Court noted that “it is well-settled that the legal father
presumption should not be extended beyond its useful sphere.”115 The
Court also recognized that the presumption was created to prevent caseby-case paternity determinations and protect children from the stigma of
illegitimacy.116 The presumption was not, according to the Court,
“intended to shield biological fathers from their support obligations.”117 If
Mr. Wetzel could be proven to be A.L.’s biological father, then, the Court
held, he would have an obligation to contribute to A.L.’s support.118
108. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. ex rel. A.L. v. Lowrie, 149 So. 3d 275
(La. 2014), opinion after grant of writ, 167 So. 3d 573 (La. 2015).
109. See Kovach, supra note 15, at 652.
110. Lowrie, 167 So. 3d at 590.
111. Justice John Weimer concurred in the judgement, writing separately to
note his concern about the possibilities of harmful delays, which may inure to
blameless children while parents hash out paternity disputes. Id. at 590.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 586.
114. Id. at 590.
115. Id. at 582 (citing Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854 (La. 1989)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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2. Reasoning
In reviewing the jurisprudence, the Court acknowledged that lower
courts in Louisiana had imposed child support obligations on biological
fathers in the past even when the children had a legally presumed father.119
In the Court’s view, it was clear that existing law provided procedures for
determining an alleged biological father’s paternity and his due contribution
to that child’s support, and that these types of determinations were in accord
with “express legislative policy.”120 Therefore, the Court concluded that Mr.
Lowrie’s defense that he should have received a deviation in the mechanical
application of the child support guidelines, taking into account Mr. Wetzel’s
income, should not have been summarily dismissed.121
The Court rejected the State’s argument that courts should refrain from
allowing legal fathers in dual paternity situations to assert defenses that
require joinder of an alleged biological father due to the potential for
causing delays in establishing support orders.122 The State asserted two
reasons that the defense should not be allowed.123 First, the State argued
that allowing such defenses would result in delays in the award of support
and in the cases of subsequent modifications of support orders.124 Second,
the State asserted that allowing such defenses would “open[] the door” for
any presumed father being sued for child support to erroneously allege that
some other man was the biological father, just so that his income would
be considered in the child support calculation.125 The Court held that the
directives found in Civil Code articles 240 and 241,126 which state that
fathers must provide support for their illegitimate children in need, should
prevail over any case management concerns that the State had.127 The
Court also noted that the sanctions provided for in Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 863 for the filing of unsubstantiated and frivolous claims
would serve as a deterrent for the kind of activity that the State was
concerned about.128 Furthermore, the Court held that in the instant case

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id. at 585–86.
Id. at 586.
Id.
Id.
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 240, 241 (2015).
Lowrie, 167 So. 3d at 586.
Id.; see also LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 863 (2015).
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“the mother’s admissions and the biological father’s DNA test results
clearly provide a good faith basis for Mr. Lowrie’s pleadings.”129
Addressing Mr. Lowrie’s assertion that Mr. Wetzel was a necessary
party who should be joined as a defendant, the Court held that if Mr.
Lowrie could establish Mr. Wetzel’s biological paternity of A.L. at trial,
then the joinder of Mr. Wetzel would be necessary.130 The Court reasoned
that if Mr. Wetzel was proven to be A.L.’s biological father, he would owe
a legal duty of support to A.L. and that this support obligation would have
an effect on the calculation of Mr. Lowrie’s support obligation.131 The
matter, therefore, could not be fully resolved without Mr. Wetzel’s joinder,
making him, by definition, a necessary party.132
The Court rejected the State’s argument that DCFS policy prohibits
enforcement actions against alleged biological fathers when the mother
has not named the biological father on her application for support services,
as was the situation in the instant case.133 The Court held that the statutory
law governing child support overrode the agency’s internal policies and
customs.134 It stated in its decision that “regulations promulgated by an
agency may not exceed the authorization delegated by the legislature.”135
Administrative agencies may only assert and exercise their delegated
authority to further the ends that the legislature was pursuing through its
delegation of power to the agency.136 The Court noted that “[t]he openended discretion to choose ends is the essence of legislative power.”137
The Court further noted that “it is this power that the legislative body
possesses, but its agents lack.”138 The Court determined that it was in the
best interest of children in “necessitous circumstances” to have their tie to
their biological fathers legally recognized, as this recognition of biological
paternity results in the biological father being obligated to contribute
support.139 According to the Court, the State had an additional interest in

129. Lowrie, 167 So. 3d at 586.
130. Id. at 587. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana has
previously held that the presumed father of a child was an indispensable party in
an action by a biological father to establish his paternity. Ebey v. Harvill, 647 So.
2d 461 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
131. Lowrie, 167 So. 3d at 587.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 587–88.
137. Id. at 588 (citing State v. Alfonso, 753 So. 2d 156, 161–62 (La. 1999)).
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854 (La. 1999)).
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determining biological paternity in situations, such as the instant one,
where the child was receiving services from the state, as this determination
would help to relieve the financial burden of providing these services
placed “upon the public fisc.”140 The statutory provisions granting DCFS
authority to enforce child support obligates DCFS to act in the child’s best
interest, including filiating that child to a biological parent who can
thereafter be compelled to provide child support.141 Therefore, the DCFS
“policy” of not pursuing action against biological fathers where the mother
has not named them actually contravened the law and was therefore
unenforceable.142 The Court’s decision made it clear that both the
biological and legal fathers in a dual paternity situation need to be part of
the child support calculus, but left the remainder of the dual paternity
problem unsolved.
III. CUCKOOS AND CUCKOLDS: THE PROBLEM
OF FORCED DUAL PATERNITY
After the Lowrie decision, biological fathers must now be joined as
necessary parties; their income is also to be considered when making child
support determinations in dual paternity situations. However, many questions
still remain regarding how, in practice, the biological father’s income is to be
considered when making child support determinations. Furthermore, the
fundamental inequity of dual paternity, which makes a presumed father
financially responsible for the children of his wife’s infidelity against his will
when a biological father has been identified, remains unresolved.
A. Procedural Uncertainty Continues
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court made it clear in Lowrie that a
biological father in a dual paternity situation is a party who should be joined
in the proceeding, and that his income should be considered in making the
final support determinations, the Court did not provide any guidance to
lower courts as to exactly how the income should be considered.143 Without
a formula or a framework for making these decisions, lower courts will
continue, as they did before the Lowrie decision, to make haphazard and ad
hoc determinations, leading to inconsistent child support determinations

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 589.
Id.
Id.
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across the state.144 This creates a serious problem because consistency in
child support awards is critical to Louisiana’s child support regime.145
Legislation is the “solemn expression of [the] legislative will”146 and
must be “applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent
with the presumed fair purpose and intention the Legislature had in
enacting it.”147 The express legislative intent in establishing the child
support guidelines was to establish uniformity in child support awards.148
The child support guidelines were in fact established in response to federal
legislation mandating the establishment of such guidelines by states to
promote, in part, uniformity among awards.149
Child support in Louisiana is to be awarded based upon the need of
the child and the ability of the parents to provide support.150 Louisiana
provides strict guidelines for courts to use when making child support
determinations.151 These guidelines are intended to equitably appropriate
the support of a child between that child’s parents in an efficient,
consistent, and adequate manner.152 The guidelines explicitly provide for
the manner in which courts are to determine the need and income of the
parties, providing worksheets for utilizing this information in the
determination of child support awards.153 If these mathematical formulas
are followed, theoretically, similarly situated parents and children will
receive identical support awards. It is a rebuttable presumption that the
amount of support determined by the guidelines is the proper amount of
144. See, e.g., Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Williams, 605 So. 2d 7 (La. Ct. App.
1992); Dep’t. of Social Servs. ex rel. Munson v. Washington, 747 So. 2d 1245
(La. Ct. App. 1999); State ex rel. Wilson v. Wilson, 855 So. 2d 913 (La. Ct. App.
1992); Fontenot v. Thierry, 422 So. 2d 586 (La. Ct. App. 1982); J.M.Y. v. R.R.,
1 So. 3d 725 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Starks v. Powell, 552 So. 2d 609 (La. Ct. App.
1989); Jones v. Rodrigue, 771 So. 2d 275 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
145. Sue Nations, Louisiana’s Child Support Guidelines: A Preliminary
Analysis, 50 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990).
146. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2 (2017); Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans,
720 So. 2d 1186, 1198 (La. 1998).
147. Sultana Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 860 So. 2d 1112, 1116 (La. 2003)
(citing In re Succession of Boyter, 756 So. 2d 1122, 1129 (La. 2000)).
148. KATHERINE SHAW SPAHT & JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, FAMILY LAW IN
LOUISIANA 327 (1st ed. 2009).
149. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The ICS of the 2001 Louisiana Child Support
Guidelines: Economics and Power, 62 LA. L. REV. 709, 721 (2002) [hereinafter
The ICS of the 2001 Louisiana Child Support Guidelines].
150. LA. CIV. CODE art. 141.
151. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:315–9:315.20 (2017).
152. Walden v. Walden, 835 So. 2d 513, 520 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
153. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:315–9:315.20.
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support,154 and courts may only deviate from the guidelines “if their
application would not be in the best interest of the child or would be
inequitable to the parties.”155
Louisiana’s child support statutes do not contain a worksheet for dual
paternity situations or any guidance as to how to deviate from the worksheets
in these situations. The Lowrie decision is similarly silent in regard to how
this deviation from the guidelines should be accomplished. Without guidance
as to a method for making deviations in a legal father’s support obligation to
take into account a biological father’s income, hearing officers and courts are
likely to attempt to do so in any number of different ways. Any of the various
methods that could be employed would undoubtedly result in varying child
support awards, which would lead to a lack of uniformity, thereby frustrating
one of the primary legislative goals.156
Furthermore, a lack of uniform results would also, in some instances,
undermine the primary purpose of the child support guidelines, which is to
provide for the best interest of children in need.157 If child support
determinations vary for similarly situated children, one child will inevitably
be receiving less in support than his similarly situated counterpart, leaving that
child not only under-supported, but also inequitably treated. The best interests
of a child are clearly not served by receiving less in support than another child
in similar circumstances, nor will the interests of Louisiana be served, as the
burden for providing for the under-supported child will undoubtedly fall on
the shoulders of the state. Unless some clarity as to proper procedure in dual
paternity situations is provided by the legislature or the judiciary, the child
support regime of Louisiana will remain broken and unfair for the innocent
children caught up in situations of their parents’ making. However, even if the
legislature were to amend the child support guidelines to account for dual
paternity situations, the inequity at the heart of dual paternity would still
remain because even if the legal father’s support obligation is reduced because
of the contribution of the biological father, at the end of the day the legal father
is still financially on the hook for a child who is both not his and is the product
of his former wife’s infidelity.

154. Id. § 9:315.1(A).
155. Id. § 9:315.1(B).
156. Nations, supra note 145, at 1058.
157. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:315.1; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 141 (2017); Lisa
Rogers Trammell, A Lawyer’s Guide to Expedited Child Support Enforcement, 44
LA. B.J. 20, 24 (1996) (“As in all child support matters, the overriding policy of
the state in support enforcement is to represent the best interests of the child.”).
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B. Fundamental Unfairness
In application, the doctrine of dual paternity often has “the end result
. . . [of forcing] a bitter and confused man to care for and support a child
that is the product of his ex-wife’s adultery.”158 What results is not a
maintained family unit, but rather enforced dysfunction,159 in which a child
is stuck in the middle of a contentious relationship among three adults.
Even if the biological father’s income is considered in such a way as to
reduce the legal father’s monetary support obligation, he is still on the
financial “hook” for a child who is not biologically his, until that child
reaches the age of majority.160 The legal father will be subject to not only
income assignment,161 but if he fails or refuses to pay, he may be subject
to suspension of a professional license162 or punishment for contempt of
court, which can include incarceration.163 The state will effectively hover
over the legal father, as the cuckoo does the purloined nest,164 threatening
him with dire consequences if he does not continue to support the child
who he had no part in creating. This kind of forced dual paternity and the
inequity and confusion that arise from it can be solved only by legislative
action aimed at preventing it from occurring in the first place.
IV. TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE: SOLVING
THE DUAL PATERNITY PROBLEM
The most effective way to resolve the uncertainty of forced dual
paternity and its fundamental unfairness is to modify the laws that give
rise to this unfortunate situation and prevent it from occurring in the first
place. The legislature could solve the problem of forced dual paternity by
158. Kovach, supra note 15, at 680.
159. Id.
160. This support obligation could possibly extend for the child’s life in cases
where the child is in need of lifetime support due to infirmity.
161. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:303. Louisiana law provides for child support to be taken
directly from a payor’s paycheck through income assignment, unless certain criteria
are met. Id. Income assignment requires participation by the payor’s employer, which
could lead to the further embarrassment and shaming of a legal father in a dual
paternity situation. Child Support Enforcement: Employer’s Resource Guide, DEP’T
OF CHILD & FAM. SERVS., http://www.dss.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&
tmp=home&nid=156&pnid=150&pid=225 [https://perma.cc/3BKN-6D8S] (last
visited Feb. 3, 2017).
162. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:315.30, 9:315.40.
163. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 224 (2017); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4611 (courts
may punish those adjudged guilty of contempt with a fine or imprisonment).
164. Schulze-Hagen, supra note 2, at 1.
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either abolishing the marital presumption of paternity that gives rise to
dual paternity or modifying the prescriptive period associated with the
disavowal action. Although both of these legislative actions would solve
the problem of forced dual paternity, modifying the prescriptive period is
the preferable choice as it represents a middle position between the oftenconflicting goals of the state and the mixed emotions of the parties
involved. Modification of the prescriptive period would serve to prevent
the vast majority of dual paternity situations from arising while also
mitigating some of the financial and emotional harms that a disavowal
action could cause the child, and other parties, involved. Such a
modification would prevent presumed fathers from being forced against
their will to support children who are not biologically theirs, while
allowing presumed fathers who wish to maintain their filiation with, and
their obligation to support, children for whom they have assumed a
parental role to do so.
A. Legislative Abandonment of the Presumption of Paternity
Abandoning the marital presumption of paternity is one way to solve
the dual paternity problem.165 The state could replace this method of
establishing filiation with an intent-based method of filiation.166 This
method would not only solve the problem of dual paternity by eliminating
forced fatherhood arising from the marital presumption of paternity, but
would also be better adapted to the social and scientific changes which have
occurred in our society.167 However, abandonment of the presumption,
though it would be effective at resolving the problem of dual paternity,
would create other issues and problems of an arguably equally troubling
nature.
An intent-based model of filiation assigns parenthood to the persons
who “actively assume[] a parental role in a child’s life, regardless of
marital status or genetic connection.”168 The intent-based model “reflects
165. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 (2017).
166. An intention-based method of filiation would assign parentage to those
parties who manifested an intent to parent the child. For a discussion of such a
model see Yehezkel Margalit, Intentional Parenthood: A Solution to the Plight of
Same-Sex Partners Striving for Legal Recognition As Parents, 12 WHITTIER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 39 (2013).
167. Natalie Angier, The Changing American Family, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/health/families.html?page_wanted
=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TP33-VEKT].
168. T. Vernon Drew, Conceiving the Father: An Ethicist’s Approach to
Paternity Disestablishment, DEL. LAW., Spring 2006, at 18, 19.
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the understanding that a child’s best interests may be better served by
assigning paternity to the [person] most willing and able to care for the
child.”169 This alternative model of filiation focuses on volitional choice,
manifested by an expression of intent, or by actions demonstrating intent
to parent.170 This approach would best serve the needs of children and
families in Louisiana because it abandons the archaic notions underlying
the current approach to determining filiation and is flexible in that it allows
for changing parental roles over time. It is similar to a contract-based
theory of filiation.171 In an age of fluid and blended family structures,
flexibility in the legal parenthood would be of great benefit to the families
of Louisiana. Under an intent-based model for assigning filiation, no
longer would a child and the husband of the child’s mother at the child’s
birth be forever legally linked against one, or both, of their wills as the
model assigns paternity to the man most willing and able to care for the
child. An intent-based approach would best account for the emotional
health of children, as “[a] parent who intends to take care of a child will
also better provide for the emotional security of a child.”172
Additionally, the intent-based model removes the focus on gender and
genetic connection that is inherent in both the traditional and genetic
models, thereby allowing for greater freedom for same-sex couples to
establish stable and legally recognized family structures.173 Providing for
the establishment of parenthood by intent has, long before the Obergefell
v. Hodges decision,174 been suggested as a way to legitimize the parental
relationship of same-sex parents to their non-biological children.175
However, an intent-based filiation model would represent a radical
departure from the current law in Louisiana and would require wideranging changes throughout the rest of the state family law regime.
Furthermore, an intent-based model of filiation may not be constitutionally
permissible given the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v.
Granville, holding that parents have a fundamental right, protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, to make decisions regarding the care and custody
169. Id.
170. Julie Shapiro, Counting from One: Replacing the Marital Presumption
with a Presumption of Sole Parentage, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
509, 516 (2012).
171. Drew, supra note 168, at 18–19.
172. Munonyedi Ugbode, Who’s Your Daddy?: Why the Presumption of
Legitimacy Should Be Abandoned in Vermont, 34 VT. L. REV. 683, 706 (2010).
173. Margalit, supra note 166, at 42–44.
174. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
175. See, e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles
to Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433 (2005).
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of their children.176 Some may also see such a change as devaluing the
marital relationship because the change would remove the marital
relationship of the parents from the determination of their children’s
parentage.
The most troubling issue with an intent-based model of filiation is the
possibility that there could be a child whom no father177 expresses the
intent to parent. This could lead to situations where a child was left
fatherless and possibly without needed support. Clearly it would not be in
the best interest of a child to rely on a single parent for support, nor would
it be in the best interest of the state, as it would likely have to provide
services to the child lacking adequate support.178 Such a radical paradigm
shift in Louisiana’s law of filiation is unlikely to occur given the current
climate of the legislature179 and may potentially raise more issues than it
resolves.180 Such a change is also inadvisable given the existence of a
simpler, less radical solution to the dual paternity problem. Although as
society and technology continue to progress and intent plays an everincreasing role in the ordering of family relationships it may make more
sense to remold Louisiana’s family law regime along intent-based lines,
now is not that time and the problem of dual paternity does not necessitate
such a solution.
B. Statutory Abolition of Dual Paternity
A potential solution to the confusion dual paternity creates would be
the abolition of the doctrine through a modification of the pertinent articles
of the Louisiana Civil Code. If the father’s action to establish paternity181
and the child’s action to establish paternity182 were modified to prohibit an
establishment of paternity when that child is already presumed to be the
child of another man, dual paternity would effectively be abolished.

176. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
177. In the same-sex context, this parent need not necessarily be a “father,”
only a second parent who expresses the intent to parent.
178. See Steve Hargreaves, Deadbeat Parents Cost Taxpayers $53 Billion,
CNN (Nov. 5, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/05/news/economy/unpaidchild-support/ [https://perma.cc/T3BZ-HR7S].
179. See, e.g., Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana House Votes 27-67 to Keep
Unconstitutional Anti-Sodomy Law on the Books, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/04/post_558.html [https://perma.cc/DY
V5-WX94].
180. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
181. LA. CIV. CODE art. 198 (2017).
182. Id. art. 197.
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However, though this type of legislative change would end dual paternity,
it would not end the inequity underlying the doctrine, namely the
obligations forced upon the legal father against his will. If dual paternity
were abolished by the legislature in such a manner, legal fathers would be
perpetually obligated to support the children of their former wife’s
adultery without being able to raise the issue of the paternity of the child’s
true biological father, as it would no longer be permissible. Although the
confusion surrounding dual paternity would be “solved,” the inequities
foisted upon the legal father would be increased and made concrete.
Another modification of the Code that could theoretically solve the
problem of dual paternity would be to make biological paternity, when
proven, legally “trump” and effectively override legal paternity created
through the marital presumption. This would theoretically resolve the
confusion surrounding the doctrine and prevent a presumed father from
being forced to support children who are not his biologically, but would
have its own serious and negative consequences. Such a modification
would prevent any legal father, even one who may have served in a
paternal role for the child for an extended number of years, from
maintaining any legal relationship with that child183 once a biological
father had been identified, even if he wished to do so. Allowing biological
paternity to “trump” legal paternity could serve to effectively break-up
existing, healthy father–child relationships. Additionally, such a change
could be seen to be devaluing the marital relationship in the same manner
as intent-based filiation. Finally, such a biology-focused approach to
filiation could have negative ramifications for same-sex and heterosexual
couples who resort to surrogacy to have children, as the third party who
contributed the genetic material to the surrogacy arrangement would
possess potential parental rights in the child that could “trump” any
parental rights afforded to the couple by their marriage. This sort of change
would cause more confusion and uncertainty than exists in the law
currently, effectively replacing the problem of dual paternity with a myriad
of other problems.
Legislative abolition of dual paternity seems like a simple solution to
the problem of dual paternity, but it is, in reality, merely a path to different
problems. The most effective way to solve the dual paternity problem,
while limiting the potential problems which may arise, is through a more
subtle modification to the Civil Code articles on paternal filiation, namely
a modification of the prescriptive periods contained in the articles. This
solution would largely solve the problem of dual paternity while also
183. The only method available would be adoption, which is expensive, complex,
and beyond the scope of this Comment.
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balancing the competing and often-conflicting interests of all of the parties
involved.
C. Modifying Prescription for Disavowal
A less radical approach to solving the problem of dual paternity would
be a modification of the prescriptive period for disavowal actions.
Currently, a husband has a short one-year window from the birth of his
wife’s child to seek disavowal.184 This short prescriptive period is the
cause of almost all dual paternity situations, and a slight modification to
this period could effectively solve the majority of the dual paternity
problem.
1. Changing the “Trigger”
One modification that could solve the problem would be to change the
event that begins the tolling of the prescriptive clock for disavowal actions.
Currently, prescription begins to run on the disavowal action in Louisiana
when the father learns or should have learned of the birth.185 However, the
husband may have no reason to suspect that the child is not his within the
first year of the child’s life. If the husband has no reason to suspect his
wife’s infidelity, and the newborn child does not possess features that are
radically different than his own, there may be no reason for the husband
to suspect his paternity in the first year of the child’s life. This prescription
regime effectively leaves husbands whose suspicions arise on the 366th
day of the child’s life out of luck, as prescription has run on their action.
The triggering event for prescription could be changed from when the
husband “learn[ed] or should have learned” of the child’s birth186 to when
the husband learned or should have learned of information that would
reasonably cause him to suspect his paternity.187 This change would allow
more trusting husbands, whose suspicions did not arise until after the first
year, an opportunity to seek disavowal if they timely sought it, and would
eliminate the vast majority of dual paternity situations. This would also
allow legal fathers who did not wish to disavow the child to remain filiated
to the child. However, there are significant practical problems with such a
change. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to exactly determine when
the husband began to suspect his paternity, as a mental impression
184. LA. CIV. CODE art. 189 (2015).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Other jurisdictions currently apply such a prescriptive rule. See, e.g., 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/8 (West 2016); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 465 (2016).
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produces no physical evidence.188 Furthermore, the husband in such a
situation would clearly have an incentive to lie, adding more deception and
uncertainty into an already confused situation.
2. Making Disavowal Imprescriptible
Alternatively, the liberative prescription for disavowal actions could be
removed altogether, thereby eliminating all instances of forced dual
paternity,189 or lengthened considerably, thereby eliminating most of such
instances. Louisiana currently has the most restrictive prescriptive period of
any state in this sort of action, and the presumption of paternity is considered
the “strongest presumption in the law” of Louisiana.190 In other jurisdictions,
the action to disavow paternity by a presumed father, or its equivalent in that
state, commonly prescribes at the child’s attainment of majority or a few
years after majority.191 Some states go even further, making the action by
the presumed father to disavow a child imprescriptible.192 If Louisiana were
to make the disavowal action imprescriptible or lengthen the prescriptive
period to the attainment of the age of majority of the child, it would

188. It is certainly true that, under the doctrine of contra non valentem,
Louisiana law currently applies a similar standard to the commencement and
running of prescription in tort actions. See Watters v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 102
So. 3d 118 (La. Ct. App. 2012), writ denied, 99 So. 3d 32 (La. 2012).
189. The qualifier “forced” is used here as it would be foreseeable that some
husbands, having assumed a parental role in the child’s life, may not seek
disavowal even if able as they may wish to continue a relationship with the child.
190. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 cmt. b (2017) (first citing Tannehill v. Tannehill,
261 So. 2d 619 (La. 1972); and then citing Williams v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 707
(La. 1956)) (“The presumption that the husband of the mother is the father of the
child has been referred to as the strongest presumption in the law.”).
191. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/8 (West 2016) (“[b]arred if
brought later than 2 years after the child reaches the age of majority”); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 600B.41A (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.031 (West 2017)
(within 18 years after birth); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.081 (West 2016) (“An
action brought under this chapter to declare the existence or nonexistence of the
father and child relationship is not barred until 3 years after the child reaches the
age of majority.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.05 (West 2016) (five years after
the child reaches 18); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.88 (2017) (“within 19 years of the
date of the birth of the child”) (explaining that an action must be filed prior to
child reaching majority).
192. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.828 (West 2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §
40-6-108 (West 2017); ALA. CODE § 26-17-606 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B15-607 (West 2016) (may be raised by the presumed father at any time prior to
filing an action for divorce).
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effectively solve the support aspect of the dual paternity problem.193
Presumed fathers would thus be allowed, if they wished, to disavow minor
children who they discovered were not biologically theirs at any time up until
majority or beyond. However, such a change is not advisable and could have
serious negative consequences for the child at the center of the action.
Both changing the “trigger” on the prescriptive clock and making
disavowal imprescriptible may open the door for persons who had fulfilled
the parental role for years, possibly decades, to attempt to disavow paternity.
Imagine, for example, the harm that would be done to family harmony, and
the psychological wellbeing of all involved, by a disavowal action being filed
by a husband against his adult children. Imagine the even greater harm done
to a child beyond the “tender years,” who is capable of discernment, if
disavowed by a man whom he had recognized all his life as his father. Both
of these “solutions” may also lead to children who are legally “fatherless” and
thereby denied support that they may desperately need. Such a result would
not be in the best interest of the child and would contravene settled public
policy.
The issue of “fatherless” children could, perhaps, be resolved by
permitting disavowal by a presumed father only if and when a biological
father was identified and confirmed. Such a change would prevent a
presumed father from disavowing his presumed child, and thereby ending
his support obligation to the child, until the child’s biological father could
be made responsible. This change would prevent a child from losing
necessary support as the obligation would be transferred from the legal
father to the biological father, though the amount of support may vary
depending upon differences in income between the two men. Furthermore,
this solution would take into account the child’s need for support while
placing the financial burden on the proper party.194 However, this may still
lead to situations in which a father who has assumed a parental role in a
child’s life for a number of years, to the point that he is recognized by both
the child and the community as the child’s father, will be able to
successfully disavow the paternity of the child if he can identify a
193. If such a change were to be made, provisions would have to be put into
place for those instances where a child, because of disability or other reasons,
requires support beyond majority. Id.
194. Of interest, but beyond the scope of this Comment, are the possible
delictual theories of recovery that a former legal father may have for child support
payments previously made. See Joana L. Grossman, When Your Daddy Is Not Really
Your Daddy: A Man Successfully Sues His Ex-Wife for Paternity Fraud Damages,
JUSTIA: VERDICT (Oct. 16, 2012), https://verdict.justia.com/2012/10/16/when-yourdaddy-is-not-really-your-daddy [https://perma.cc/65CM-FPXM]. See also Gallo v.
Gallo, 861 So. 2d 168 (La. 2003).
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biological father. The emotional, social, and psychological impact that the
pursuit of such an action would have on a child who is intellectually
capable of understanding what is occurring would likely be devastating
whether or not the action were successful. A better balance between
possible inequity suffered by a legal father and the best interest of children
should be reached in resolving the problem of dual paternity.
3. A Peremptive Solution
A fairer, more equitable solution to the problem of dual paternity
would be to abandon the current prescriptive limit governing disavowal
actions195 and replace it with something akin to the peremptive period for
the father’s action to establish paternity when the child is presumed to be
the child of another man.196 Currently, Louisiana Civil Code article 198
provides that if a child is presumed to be the child of another man, a father
must institute an action to establish his paternity of the child within one
year from the day of the birth of the child, unless the mother of the child
deceived the father in bad faith regarding his paternity, in which instance
he has one year from when he “knew or should have known of his
paternity, or within ten years from the day of the birth of the child,
whichever first occurs.”197 If the disavowal action were subject to a similar
peremptive period, with an extension for bad-faith deception on the part
of the mother and a ten-years-from-birth outward limit, most dual paternity
issues would be resolvable without any great harm or inequity being
suffered by any party involved.198 As a further protection against the
possibility of fatherless children, in adapting this peremptive period to the
disavowal action the legislature should add a further restriction prohibiting
the bringing of a disavowal action unless or until a biological father has
been identified and can be made legally responsible for the child. This
change would result in the resolution of the dual paternity problem without
necessitating a complete overhaul of Louisiana’s family law regime.
Furthermore, and very importantly, such a change would allow a legal
father an opportunity to make a decision regarding whether he wanted to
continue in a parental role with his presumed child. Currently, the law
provides no opportunity for choice, forcing presumed fathers to remain
195. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 (2017).
196. Id. art. 198.
197. Id.
198. Such an extension for bad-faith deception and fraud is the approach taken
by a number of other states. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-8-59 (2017)
(extension of 60 days from the creation of presumption except in cases where
there are allegations of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact).
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legally connected to, and therefore obligated to, children who are not
biologically their own. Such a change would not, however, force a legal
father to pursue a disavowal action if he did not wish to do so and would
not allow his legally, and socially, established fatherhood to be trumped
by the biological paternity of another man who may have little to no
connection to the child. Such a change would actually allow the presumed
father the opportunity to forever establish his filiation by his conscious
choice to allow the peremptive period to run. If the legislature were to
make this relatively minor modification to the law of paternal filiation,
children would not be left fatherless and without support, and presumed
fathers would not be forced into a continuing paternal role unless they
chose to do so of their own free will.
CONCLUSION
Every month, ex-husbands across Louisiana are forced to write checks
for child support payments to their ex-wives for the support of children
that are the biological progeny of another man.199 These legal fathers must
suffer this financial burden or be faced with penalties, including
imprisonment.200 This inequity should not be tolerated. Louisiana should
amend its law to solve the problem of dual paternity once and for all rather
than chipping away at the doctrine slowly through judicial decisionmaking. Although the need to address this problem is great, the interest
and needs of innocent children must also be considered and protected. The
problem of forced dual paternity requires a solution that will result in no
man being forced, against his will, into dual paternity and no child being
left without needed support. The modifications proposed to Civil Code
article 185 present such a solution. The modifications would both remove
the inequity and harm forced upon the legal father while also ensuring that
children are not left fatherless and therefore without much-needed
financial support. By making this change, Louisiana will be placing its law
in line with the majority of other jurisdictions and the family law regime
of Louisiana will more closely align with the social and legal realities of
the state and country. When the hour has been struck, the wooden cuckoo
retreats into the clock and the door closes behind him. The hour has now
struck, and it is time to slam the door on forced dual paternity.

199. See Child Support Enforcement SFY 2015-2016: Cases - Obligations Paternities, DEPT. OF CHILD & FAM. SERVS., (last visited Feb. 3, 2017),
http://www.dcfs.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/searchable/OFS/Statistics/Stats15-16/CSE
/fy1516_SES_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5PQ-4NS6].
200. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4611 (2017) (punishment for contempt of court).
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ADDENDUM
After this Comment was accepted for publication, Louisiana State
Representative Patrick Jefferson introduced House Bill 388 in the
Louisiana House of Representatives during the 2016 Regular Session.201
House Bill 388, introduced on the recommendation of the Louisiana Law
Institute, made numerous changes to the law of filiation in Louisiana.202
One of these changes was to amend and reenact Civil Code article 189 to
change the liberative prescriptive period for disavowal actions brought by
presumed fathers from “one year . . . [commencing] to run from the day
the husband learns or should have learned of the birth of the child”203 to
“one year . . . [commencing] to run from the day of the birth of the child,
or the day the husband knew or should have known that he may not be the
biological father of the child, whichever occurs later.”204 This change was
sought to eliminate the previously discussed inequities associated with
dual paternity and put an end to what some observers considered an
“epidemic” of women purposefully taking advantage of the law to make
men legally and financially responsible for children who were not
biologically theirs.205 After being passed by both the Louisiana House and
Senate with no amendments to the recommended changes to the language
of Civil Code article 189, the act was signed by Governor John Bel
Edwards on June 2, 2016, becoming effective that day.206
Although this change to Civil Code article 189 is similar to the
solution proposed by this Comment, it differs in one significant way in
that the new article 189 retains the designation of the one-year period as
prescriptive rather than peremptive.207 Although liberative prescription
and peremption are related concepts, they differ in two fundamental ways:
first, whereas the running of liberative prescription prevents only the
enforcement of a right by legal action,208 the termination of a peremptive
period destroys the cause of action itself;209 and second, whereas the
201. Kevin Litten, How Long Should a Husband Have to Challenge Paternity?
Bill Seeks to Change 1-Year Limit, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.nola
.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/husband_paternity_time_periods.html [https://perma
.cc/7M6K-MH9A].
202. 2016 La. Acts 388.
203. LA. CIV. CODE art. 189 (2015).
204. LA. CIV. CODE art. 189 (2017).
205. Litten, supra note 201.
206. 2016 La. Acts 388.
207. LA. CIV. CODE art. 189.
208. Id. art. 3447.
209. Id. art. 3458.
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running of liberative prescription is subject to interruption210 and
suspension,211 peremption is not.212 When dealing with an issue as
personally and socially sensitive as the paternity of children, the certainty
and finality of a peremptive period are preferable to the uncertainty and
contestability of the running of prescription.
Additionally, this Comment recommended an outward peremptive
limit of ten years from the birth of the child for the institution of a
disavowal action by a presumed father.213 The new article 189 contains no
such outward limit in which to bring such an action, triggering the running
of prescription from the latter of the birth of the child or the moment when
the father knew or should have known that he may not be the biological
father of the child.214 This opens the door for disavowal actions to be
brought against older and adult children. Whereas a younger child who is
below the age of understanding may not be emotionally harmed by his
presumed father’s disavowal, a child of a more advanced age will be
cognizant of what is occurring and more likely to suffer both socially and
emotionally by the commencement of such an action. Furthermore, to
permit such an action to be brought against adult children, who may have
known no other father in their lives and whom society already recognizes
as the children of the presumed father, does the disservice of injecting a
heightened level of uncertainty and instability into what is one of the most
sensitive relationships in our society—that between parent and child. The
ten-year outward peremptive limit suggested by this Comment would
strike a balance between the rights of the presumed father, the rights of the
child, and the societal and personal needs of all and would ensure that
these sensitive and important relationships are determined and settled with
certainty.
Although the recent changes the Louisiana Legislature made to Civil
Code article 189 provide presumed fathers a greatly increased opportunity
to escape the unjust burdens of forced dual paternity, they have done so at
the expense of the innocent children involved in these situations. By
further amending article 189 to place a peremptive rather than a
prescriptive period on disavowal actions brought by presumed fathers and
to place a reasonable peremptive outward limitation on such actions, the
legislature could better protect the rights and needs of the children at issue
210. See, e.g., id. art. 3462. See also Douglas Nichols, Contra Non Valentem,
56 LA. L. REV. 337, 338 (1995).
211. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 3469.
212. Id. art. 3461; see also Ebinger v. Venus Const. Corp., 65 So. 3d 1279,
1286 (La. 2011).
213. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
214. LA. CIV. CODE art. 189.
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while still allowing presumed fathers the opportunity to avoid the legal
duty to support children who are not biologically theirs.
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